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Ohio SB5 and the Attempt to “Yeshiva”
Public University Faculty
Mary Ellen Benedict 1 & Louis M. Benedict 2

Introduction
After the 2010 national and state elections ended with a more conservative set of
Republican politicians making public policy, particularly in state governorships and
legislatures, several individual states became battlegrounds over the collective bargaining
rights of public sector workers. In Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker and the Republican
legislature pushed through a bill that limits the collective bargaining power of state and
local municipality employees (exceptions were made for firefighters and police) and
required higher payment by employees for health care and pensions (Reuters, 2011). A
failed attempt to recall Governor Walker in 2012 leaves Walker’s law in place as of the
writing of this article (The New York Times, 2012). Other new laws across the country
include those that lead to severe cuts to health care and pension funds to public sector
workers in New Jersey (The New York Times, 2012), a right-to-work law in place in
Indiana (Davey, 2012), and a voter-approved reduction to city workers’ pensions in San
Diego and San Jose (Semuels, 2012). However, none of the states that changed public
sector bargaining included the unique attack on faculty collective bargaining using the
1980 Yeshiva decision as the Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5) did.
In 2011, the introduction of SB5 attempted to drastically curtail public sector
collective bargaining in Ohio. The bill included language that appeared to classify public
university faculty as managers (or supervisors) and exclude them as employees eligible to
bargain collectively. Although the original bill as introduced abolished all public
employee collective bargaining, the final amended version of SB5 indirectly eliminated
public sector faculty from collective bargaining by classifying faculty as management
level employees (or supervisors), not eligible to bargain collectively. The underlying
legal reasoning that resulted in the final version of SB5 was proposed by the president of
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the state’s association of public universities (Berrett, 2011a). The Inter-University
Council of Ohio (IUC), an organization of top administrators from the state universities
in Ohio, proposed an amendment to the legislation under the guise of applying the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University
(1980). Under Yeshiva, faculty can be determined to be managers and therefore excluded
from collective bargaining. The Yeshiva decision applies only to faculty at private
colleges and universities, which are covered by federal labor law. An initial question then
is, does SB5 accurately reflect the Yeshiva decision?
Although SB5 was revoked by voter referendum, two additional questions are left
unanswered: (1) If SB5 had gone unchallenged by voter referendum, what would the
immediate effect be on faculty collective bargaining? (i.e., would faculty at public
institutions of higher education automatically be ineligible to bargain collectively?); and,
(2) If SB5 was not revoked by referendum, could SB5 be successfully challenged by
faculty in its application to faculty collective bargaining? Answers to these questions not
only provide insight into future issues for higher education faculty in Ohio, but also in
other states that attempt similar legislative maneuvering.
Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio
Public employee collective bargaining at the state and local level is not regulated by
federal labor law. Section 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (2008)
specifically exempts public employees of a state and its political subdivisions from
coverage under the Act. However, the federal constitutional right of public employees to
join a union is well-established. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects faculty members at public institutions of higher education to speak freely, to
associate with others, and to petition the government for redress of grievances. It also
protects the right of associations, such as unions, to engage in advocacy on behalf of its
members (Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, Local 1315, 1979). Thus,
faculty are protected from government retaliation in joining unions. However, the United
States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, Local 1315
(1979), held that the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative duty on the
government to listen to, to respond to, or to recognize a union association and bargain
with it. Consequently, faculty are free to join unions and unions can attempt to bargain
with the government, but the government is not obligated by the United States
Constitution to bargain with a faculty (or any) union. Thus, it is up to state law to
determine the level of obligation, if any, of state and local government to bargain
collectively with its public employees.
Although the U.S. Constitution does not obligate government to bargain with public
employee unions, some state constitutions, such as those of Florida (Fla. Const.) and
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Hawaii (Haw. Const.), provide explicit protection for the right of public employees to
bargain collectively. A provision in a state constitution that establishes the right of public
employees to bargain collectively provides much more protection than a state statute,
because constitutions are much more difficult to change or amend than legislative
statutes. State constitutions also supersede any state or local legislation. Ohio has no such
state constitutional protection for public sector collective bargaining.
In the absence of state constitutional protection, there are four different types of
state and local legal protection regarding the right of public employees to bargain
collectively: (a) some states authorize public sector bargaining by statute (either for all or
specific occupations); (b) some states specifically outlaw public sector bargaining; (c) in
some states, bargaining is authorized by executive order or local ordinance; and (d) in
some states, there is no legislation either authorizing or prohibiting bargaining. Kearney
(2009) found that legislation or other policies imposing a duty to bargain or meet and
confer with at least one group of public workers are in effect in approximately 43 states.
Although there are many variations in state policies regarding public sector collective
bargaining, the trend has been to extend comprehensive coverage to all state and local
government workers (Kearney, 2009). Most of the state public employee bargaining laws
were enacted over a period of about 10 years, from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s
(Kearney, 2009). However, Ohio did not enact a state public bargaining law until 1983,
after years of long political battles. Saltzman (1988) found that “before 1983, Ohio’s
public sector labor relations were largely unregulated by law” (p. 42). Kearney (2009)
noted that only four states have passed major collective bargaining laws since the
1970s—Ohio, Illinois, New Mexico, and Washington. Thus, Ohio had years of public
sector bargaining legislation and experiences from other states, as well as the federal
government, in order to write its own comprehensive public sector collective bargaining
legislation.
Ohio also had its own unique experiences with public sector bargaining prior to the
passage of its public sector collective bargaining statute. There were some statutes and
court decisions that regulated particular aspects of public sector labor relations in Ohio,
as well as a number of bills that failed to be enacted. The issue of public sector
bargaining in Ohio was continually discussed and debated in state and local government
and public sector concerted activity existed without formal legislative authorization.
In January, 1947, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the case of Hagerman v. Dayton
(1947), which held that municipal governments could not permit voluntary deduction of
dues from their public employee’s paychecks and declared that there is no authority for
the delegation of any powers or functions of either a municipality or its civil service
appointees to any organization (in this case, a union). The court found that there was no
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municipal purpose or benefit served by the dues check-off of wages of civil service
employees, except as a means of maintaining union membership, and therefore, the
action was “contrary to the spirit and purpose of the civil service laws of the state”
(Hagerman v. Dayton, 1947, p. 328). On June 14, 1947, Amended Senate Bill No. 261
(SB261), referred to as the Ferguson Act, was passed by the legislature and approved by
Governor Thomas Herbert on June 20, 1947. Section 2 of SB261 prohibited any
government employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state from striking.
Under Section 4 of SB261 any striker who was rehired would receive no pay increase for
one year and would be on probation for two years.
In 1959, a watered down version of a bill that would have protected the rights of
public employees to join a union and informally negotiate resulted only in overturning
part of the 1947 Hagerman court ruling that outlawed dues check-off provisions
(Saltzman, 1988). However, in the 1960s, there was frequent non-enforcement of antiunion provisions of the law (Saltzman, 1988). By 1968, despite the Hagerman ruling that
declared public sector bargaining was an improper delegation of governmental authority,
the cities of Cincinnati, Akron, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown had all
signed contracts with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) (Saltzman, 1988). Also by 1968, the Ferguson Act’s severe strike
penalties were rarely invoked against public employees (Saltzman, 1988).
Further support of public sector collective bargaining agreements was provided by
the courts. In 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Dayton Classroom Teachers Association
v. Dayton Board of Education, held that “a board of education is vested with the
discretionary authority to negotiate and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
its employees” (p. 132). The court also held that a binding arbitration clause contained in
such agreement must be honored by the board where the grievance involves the
application or interpretation of a valid term of the agreement and the arbitrator is
specifically prohibited from making any decision that is inconsistent with the terms of the
agreement or contrary to law (Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board
of Education, 1975). Saltzman (1988) found that this ruling reflected de facto acceptance
of public sector bargaining during the early 1960s and 1970s. Despite popular acceptance
of public sector bargaining, then Ohio Governor James F. Rhodes vetoed public sector
bargaining bills in 1975 and 1977 (Saltzman, 1988). However, by 1983, Democrats
controlled both the Ohio House and Senate and the governor’s office (Troy, 2011).
Amended Senate Bill No. 133 was passed on June 30, 1983 and Governor Richard F.
Celeste signed SB133 into law (Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act) on July 6,
1983, effective October 6, 1983.
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Although not a single Republican voted for SB133 (Troy, 2011), “Republicans
controlled the governor’s office and both houses of the legislature for 12 years from 1995
to 2006, but did not try to throw out the 1983 law” (Hershey, 2011, p. 3). Part of the
reason may be the stabling effect it had on employment relations. “According to the State
Employment Relations Board, there were 183 public employee strikes from 1978 to
1980, with no data available for 1981-1983” (Hershey, 2011, p. 3). However, “from
1984-2010, there have been 211 strikes including none last year [2010]” (Hershey, 2011,
p. 3). Thus, in the years prior to SB5, the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act
appears to have decreased disruption of public service caused by strikes.
Faculty at public higher education institutions in Ohio were involved in collective
bargaining long before Ohio officially protected public sector collective bargaining. Two
public institutions of higher education, Youngstown State University and Northwest State
Community College, negotiated faculty collective bargaining agreements that began in
1973 (Hurd, Bloom, & Johnson, 1998), ten years before the Ohio’s Public Employees’
Collective Bargaining Act became law. By 1983, nine additional public institutions of
higher education elected faculty collective bargaining agents (Hurd et al., 1998). The
trend continued during the 1980s and 1990s as many of the two-year Ohio public
institutions elected bargaining agents and voted for contracts. Four-year institutions also
moved toward collective bargaining, and the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) was elected at Kent State University and the University of Cincinnati
in 1975 and at the University of Toledo and Cleveland State University in 1993 (Hurd, et
al., 1998). More recent additions to faculty unionization include Akron State University
(American Association of University Professors, 2004) and Bowling Green State
University (Nichols, 2010). Today Miami University of Ohio, Ohio University, and Ohio
State University are the only four-year Ohio public institutions that have not yet elected a
faculty collective bargaining agent (State Employee Relations Board, 2012).
Prior to SB5, Section 4117.03 of the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act
(2010) gave Ohio public employees the right to form unions and bargain collectively in
regard to wages, hours, terms, and other conditions of employment. On February 2, 2011,
the initial Ohio Senate Bill 5 (S.B. No. 5) was introduced. Its stated intent was that
sections of the Ohio Revised Code be amended, enacted, or repealed to prohibit the state
entities, including state institutions of higher education, and their employees from
collective bargaining. After considerable opposition, the bill was amended to allow
public sector collective bargaining but with significant restrictions and the substitute bill
(Sub. Bill No. 5) was passed by the Ohio Senate on March 2, 2011. Further amendments
were made and the final bill, Amended Substitute Senate Bill Number 5 (Am. Sub. S.B.
5), was passed (subsequently referred to as Senate Bill 5 or SB5) by the Ohio General
Assembly (both the Ohio House and Senate) on March 30, 2011. The bill was signed by
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Governor Kasich on March 31, 2011 (to be effective July 1, 2011). SB5 greatly limited
public sector collective bargaining rights, including prohibiting “public employees” from
striking (reminiscent of the 1947 Ferguson Act) and it required the public employer to
deduct from the compensation of a striking employee an amount equal to twice the daily
rate of pay for each day or part thereof that the employee was engaged in a strike. It
expanded the list of subjects that are inappropriate for collective bargaining. It also
eliminated the ability of the parties to submit disputes to agreed-upon dispute resolution
process.
With specific regard to faculty at state institutions and the focus of the remainder of
this paper, SB5 expanded the definition of “supervisor” and “management level
employee” in an attempt to reclassify faculty as one or both and thereby make faculty
ineligible to bargain collectively. However, SB5 was repealed by Voter Referendum on
November 8, 2011. Nevertheless, this attempt to prohibit collective bargaining by faculty
at public institutions is of vital concern as it may be used again in the future, not only in
Ohio but in other states.
SB5 and Higher Education Faculty as Supervisors or Managers
The legal reasoning that underpinned the final amended version of SB5 “that seeks
to scuttle collective bargaining for faculty unions in Ohio’s public colleges came from the
president of the state’s association of universities” (Berrett, 2011a, para. 1). “Bruce E.
Johnson, president of the association, Inter-University Council of Ohio, confirmed [to the
Chronicle of Higher Education] in an interview on Tuesday [March 8, 2011] that he had
suggested the measure to members of the state Senate” (Schmidt, 2011b, para. 2). In
testimony before the Ohio Senate Insurance, Commerce, & Labor Committee, chaired by
Senator Kevin Bacon, Inter-University Council (IUC) President Bruce Johnson testified
on the objective of the proposed legislative amendments:
The IUC supports the changes to law that relate to higher education as
recommended in Senate Bill 5. For employees of institutions of higher education,
the bill is fairly straightforward – it expressly states that employees of any state
institution of higher education do not have collective bargaining rights. (InterUniversity Counsel of Ohio, February 22, 2011 testimony of B. Johnson).
The participation of the IUC was much stronger than mere oral support for the
elimination of faculty collective bargaining, as it involved drafting legislative language
that was designed for that specific purpose:
Bruce Johnson, head of the IUC, said that he first proposed during a Senate hearing
the use of language from the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case National Labor
Relations Board vs. Yeshiva, which ruled that private university faculty are
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ineligible for collective bargaining. Johnson does credit BGSU General Counsel
Sean Fitzgerald for helping to draft the language that was submitted to Ohio Sen.
Kevin Bacon early this year. (Sentinel-Tribune, 2011, para. 2)
Prior to the introduction of SB5, the Ohio Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining
Act (2010) specifically excluded both “management level employees” (Section 4117.01
(C) (7)) and “supervisors” (Section 4117.01 (C) (10)) from the definition of public
employees eligible to bargain collectively. The proponents of SB5 attempted to exclude
faculty from collective bargaining by adding specific language that would effectively reclassify all faculty as supervisors or managers. The existing definitions of supervisor and
manager passed by the Ohio legislature in 1983 (SB 133) (Ohio Public Employees
Collective Bargaining Act) were based directly on the federal definitions, with some
extensions that classified heads of departments and divisions as supervisors, but without a
specific determination as required for private enterprises under the federal law.
The definition of supervisor in Section 4117.01 (F) of the Public Employees’
Collective Bargaining Act (2010) followed the same definition that is used in Section 2
(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (2008). Therefore, there would be considerable
experience and guidance on interpreting the application of this section both by the Ohio
State Employment Relations Board (SERB) and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). Section 4117.01 (F) of the Ohio Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act
(2010) defined supervisor:
“Supervisor” means any individual who has authority, in the interest of the public
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other public employees; to responsibly direct them; to adjust
their grievances; or to effectively recommend such action, if the exercise of that
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
The Ohio legislature provided additional specific guidance for interpretation in applying
the term “supervisor” to faculty at state higher education institutions. Prior to SB5,
Section 4117.01 (F) of the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act (2010), in
defining a Supervisor with regard to faculty, stated:
(3) With respect to faculty members of a state institution of higher education, heads
of departments or divisions are supervisors; however, no other faculty member or
group of faculty members is a supervisor solely because the faculty member or
group of faculty members participate in decisions with respect to courses,
curriculum, personnel, or other matters of academic policy;
This section of the Ohio code did not eliminate faculty from being classified as
supervisors, but eliminated faculty being classified as supervisors based solely on
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academic-related criteria associated with faculty as professionals. Even without this
clause faculty may not be considered supervisors under the existing law because
participation in these activities may be part of the professional duties of faculty.
Nevertheless, this subsection does clarify what is to be considered in determining
whether a faculty member is a supervisor or is simply a professional non-supervisor
eligible to bargain collectively. Thus, the legislature was simply proscribing specific
guidance and instructions to SERB.
This section of the Act also specifically designated all heads of departments and
heads of divisions as supervisors regardless of whether chairs at a specific institution
actually meet the Act’s definition of a supervisor. If this language were not inserted,
some heads of department may otherwise be determined to be supervisors, but others may
not be found so. Likewise, some heads of divisions may have that position by title alone
and may not meet the Act’s definition of a supervisor. If heads of departments or
divisions actually had supervisory duties or managerial authority, then there would be no
need to specifically exclude them. They would meet one (or both) of the definitions and
be excluded from bargaining collectively.
The proposed IUC amendment of Section 4117 (F) stated (with proposed deletions
and additions):
(3) With respect to faculty members of a state institution of higher education, heads
of departments or divisions are supervisors; however, no other faculty member or
group of faculty members is a supervisor solely because the faculty member or
group of faculty members participate in decisions with respect to courses,
curriculum, personnel, or other matters of academic policy; in addition, any faculty
member or group of faculty members that participate in decisions with respect to
courses, curriculum, personnel, or matters of academic or institutional policy shall
be deemed supervisors or managers, (Johnson, B., Johnson to K. Bacon, February
25, 2011)
The final version of SB5 regarding Section 4117.01 (F) (3) was essentially the same as
that proposed by the IUC (the word “however” was eliminated completely and the word
“managers” was changed to “management level employees”) (Amended Substitute
Senate Bill No. 5 As Passed by the Senate, 2011).
Prior to SB5, Section 4117.01 (C) (7) of the Public Employees Collective
Bargaining Act (2010) provided that “Management level employees” were specifically
excluded from the definition of “public employee” and, therefore, not eligible to bargain
collectively. Section 4117.01 (L) defined “Management level employee” and included
specific instructions in applying this exclusion to faculty:
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“Management level employee” means any individual who formulates policy on
behalf of the public employer, who responsibly directs the implementation of
policy, or who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to
assist in the preparation for the conduct of negotiations, administer collectively
negotiated agreements, or have a major role in personnel administration. Assistant
superintendents, principals, and assistant principals whose employment is governed
by 3319.02 of the Revised Code are management level employees. With respect to
members of a faculty of a state institution of higher education, no person is a
management level employee because of the person’s involvement in the
formulation or implementation of academic or institutional policy. (Public
Employees’ Bargaining Act, 2010)
The first sentence of this definition was essentially derived from decisions interpreting
the National Labor Relations Act, which does not contain a definition of managerial
employee or a statutory exclusion for managerial employees. The next two sentences are
specific inclusions and exclusions made by the Ohio legislature. In many states, the
exclusion of managerial employees from statutory coverage is read narrowly (Malin et
al., 2011).
The IUC requested that the legislature change Section 4117.01 (L) to their
proposed amendment language (with changes underlined):
(L) “Management level employee” means an individual who formulates policy on
behalf of the public employer, who responsibly directs the implementation of
policy, or who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to
assist in the preparation for the conduct of negotiations, administer collectively
negotiated agreements, or have a major role in personnel administration. Assistant
superintendents, principals, and assistant principals whose employment is governed
by 3319.02 of the Revised Code are management level employees. With respect to
members of a faculty of a state institution of higher education, any faculty who,
individually or through a faculty senate or like organization, participate in the
governance of the institution, are involved in personnel decisions, selection or
review of administrators, planning and use of physical resources, budget
preparations, and determination of educational policies related to admissions,
curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction and research are management
level employees. (Johnson, B., Johnson to K. Bacon, February 25, 2011)
The IUC believed that these changes to the definition of supervisor and manager to
the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act would exclude all full-time faculty from
collective bargaining. Because Section 4117.01 (C) (13) specifically excluded part-time
faculty from the definition of public employee and SB5 did not change this clause, the
legislation as written was intended to end collective bargaining on Ohio public university
campuses.
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Yeshiva and its Misapplication
The IUC’s rationale in suggesting the language to members of the state Senate was
that the bill extends to the faculty of public institutions the same reasoning that was used
by the United States Supreme Court in the NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980). As noted
earlier, the IUC assumed that all public university faculty would be excluded as managers
and/or supervisors under the Yeshiva-like language of SB5 and thereby excluded from
collective bargaining. “Bruce Johnson, president and CEO of the Inter-University
Council of Ohio, acknowledged that he suggested the language to the members of the
state Senate, which was later reflected in Senate Bill 5” (Berrett, 2011a, para. 2). The
IUC letter to Ohio State Senator Kevin Bacon, which included the proposed amendment
changes to include faculty in the definition of managers and supervisors, explained the
Yeshiva basis:
In Yeshiva, the court held that faculty members at “mature” private colleges and
universities are managerial employees and may not organize and bargain under the
provisions of the NLRA. The IUC believes the same thinking should apply to
public universities. (Johnson, B., Johnson to K. Bacon, February 25, 2011)
The allegation was not only that this was simply applying Yeshiva to public universities,
but also that by its mere inclusion public university faculty would automatically be
considered managers (or supervisors) and thereby excluded by law from collective
bargaining. This interpretation of Yeshiva was also fostered by the media. Inside Higher
Ed stated:
The legal reasoning used in the bill essentially cites the premise used in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, which applies only to private college professors, and brings it to
those working at public universities. The 1980 Supreme Court decision barred
faculty members at private colleges from bargaining collectively on the grounds
that they enjoyed managerial status because of their role in shared governance.
(Berrett, 2011b, para. 7)
The Chronicle of Higher Education discussed the classification provision defining
“management-level employees” in SB5:
Such language echoes a distinction the U.S. Supreme Court drew in 1980 in its
landmark National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University decision, which
dealt solely with private institutions and had the effect of making it harder for most
faculty members at private colleges to unionize. If signed into law, the provision in
Ohio is expected to have a similar impact on public colleges in that state,
effectively denying the right to engage in collective bargaining to those faculty
members who want to continue to play a significant role in the governance of their
institutions. (Schmidt, 2011b, para. 9).
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The characterization of the IUC proposed language as applying a straightforward
application of Yeshiva or being “Yeshiva-like” was not only interpreted by university
administration representatives and the media, but also by faculty representatives. The
Ohio Conference of the American Association of University Professors, in Ohio Academe
(“The Fight Against Senate Bill 5,” 2011), expressed this interpretation:
Of particular concern for faculty is the Yeshiva-like language in the Amended
Substitute Bill that defines full-time college and university faculty as managerial
employees. Under this sweeping definition, conceivably every faculty member
could be labeled a manager, and thus be denied the right to collectively bargain.
If this language remains in the legislation, and the bill takes effect, professors
would essentially have the right to make the decision of whether they want to
participate in a shame of a collective bargaining process or continue to have a mere
advisory say in matters like curriculum, subject matter and other areas of collective
bargaining. (pp. 3-4)
Sara Kaminski, the executive director of the Ohio Conference AAUP, sent a newsletter to
members in the state “asking ‘why are Ohio’s university faculty being Yeshiva’d,’
referring to the 1980 Supreme Court decision” (Jascik, 2011, para. 8). Thus, SB5 was
viewed as directly applying Yeshiva or Yeshiva-like language to public university faculty,
with the clear result that faculty would be ineligible to bargain collectively. The goal of
the Ohio AAUP was to prevent SB5 from passing, or after SB5 passed, to revoke it by
referendum. The analysis of the language of the proposed legislation and its application
by SERB and the courts were generally ignored.
Faculty were being “Yehsiva’d.” The focus was on the intended application of the
proposed amendments to classify public university faculty as managers or supervisors. It
was assumed (a) that the language of SB5 with regard to faculty accurately reflected the
Yeshiva guidance regarding managerial and supervisory exclusions, (b) that the
application of Yeshiva would automatically make faculty managers (and/or supervisors)
under law, and (c) that Yeshiva applied in the same way to faculty at public universities
and colleges as it does to private colleges and universities. However, these assumptions
are mistaken. First, the Supreme Court did not examine whether faculty were supervisors
in Yeshiva. Second, the Supreme Court in Yeshiva did not conclude that all university
faculty are managers, but only that some university faculty in some circumstances could
be managers. Third, Yeshiva was a private university, which has a greatly different
managerial structure than that of a government entity.
The IUC letter of February 25, 2011 to Senator Kevin Bacon, cited the supervisor
exemption of Section 4117.01 (F) (3) to conclude that faculty were legally permitted to
bargain collectively in Ohio solely by this section, which, the IUC alleged, was designed
to nullify the application of Yeshiva:
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States like Ohio are an anomaly in that faculty at Ohio’s public universities have
been afforded both “shared governance” and faculty bargaining by virtue of this
lone “sentence” in Ohio’s collective bargaining law (R.C. 4117.01(F)(3). . . . That
language was inserted when the law was originally passed in 1983 to expressly
obviate the import of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva (1980).
(Johnson, B., Johnson to K. Bacon, February 25, 2011)
However, in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Yeshiva University (1980),
the U.S. Supreme Court did not analyze whether the faculty in Yeshiva were supervisors.
The Court stated:
Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to be managerial employees, it did
not decide the question of their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with
that court’s application of the managerial exclusion, we also need not resolve that
issue of statutory interpretation. (NLRB v. Yeshiva, 1980, p. 682)
Because the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act based its supervisor
exclusion directly on the supervisor exclusion language of the NLRA and the fact that the
judicially created managerial exclusion (NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974)) and the Yeshiva (1980) case had been decided years prior to the Ohio act, it is
unlikely that the Ohio legislature would insert language into the supervisor exclusion
section to specifically obviate the managerial exclusion in Yeshiva. If anything, this
subsection automatically removes the potential benefit of Yeshiva’s guidance in relation
to heads of departments because it defines them as supervisors ineligible to bargain
collectively by virtue of their title. Ohio had created the separate management level
employee exclusion section after Yeshiva was decided.
The analysis of whether an individual is a supervisor or a manager is dependent on
the interpretation of two different laws, both in federal labor law and in Ohio public
employee labor law. In federal labor law, the analysis involves the interpretation and
application of the National Labor Relations Act (Section 2 (11) of the NLRA) for
supervisor analysis and federal court cases (this exemption is not statutory but was
judicially established) for managerial exclusion analysis. Yeshiva only addresses the
managerial exclusion in federal labor law. In Ohio, this determination involves statutory
interpretation and application for both supervisor exclusion analysis (Section 4117.01 (C)
and (F) of the Ohio Revised Code) and management level employee exclusion analysis
(Section 4117.01 (C) and (L) of the Ohio Revised Code). Although an individual may be
both a supervisor and a manager, the decision must be determined by two distinct
analyses. The U.S. Supreme Court in Yeshiva specifically declined to address the
supervisor exclusion issue as applied to university faculty. Thus, faculty could not be
Yeshiva’d into being considered supervisors.
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Second, including Yeshiva or Yeshiva-like language in a bill does not automatically
result in faculty being considered managers. In Yeshiva, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the existence of managerial status must depend on the facts of each case and not on
conclusory rationales (NLRB V. Yeshiva, 1980). The Court recognized that faculty are
professionals and their participation in decisions may be related to their professional
duties and not because they are managers. Public university faculty are clearly
professionals under federal and Ohio law, as defined in Section 2 (12) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (2009), which is similar to the Ohio definition in Section
4117.01 (I) (Section 40117.01 (J) in Am. Sub. S. B. No. 5, 2011) of the Ohio Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Act (2010). Professionals can bargain collectively under
federal and Ohio law. The United States Supreme Court in Yeshiva explained that not all
professionals are managers:
We are certainly not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that
would sweep all professionals outside of the Act in derogation of Congress’ intent
to protect them. The Board [NLRB] has recognized that employees whose
decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects
to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage if union
membership may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee’s activities fall
outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated
professionals will he be found aligned with management. (NLRB v. Yeshiva, 1980.
p. 690)
Therefore, university faculty involvement in activities must be analyzed in regard to
duties routinely performed by similarly-situated faculty professionals. The Yeshiva Court
expressed some of the potential limits to the managerial exclusion with regard to faculty
as professionals:
It is plain, for example that professors may not be excluded merely because they
determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own students, and
supervise their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher learning
unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial.
There may also be faculty members at Yeshiva and like universities who properly
could be included in a bargaining unit. (NLRB v. Yeshiva, 1980. p. 690)
SB5 stated just the opposite. SB5 stated that a faculty member is a supervisor or
management level employee if that faculty member participates in decisions with respect
to courses or curriculum. SB5 does not exclude faculty’s own courses or curriculum or
their own research. In addition, heads of departments and heads of divisions are
specifically excluded as supervisors, without analysis of whether they fit the statutory
definition of supervisor (or management level employee). Further, the retention of the
categorical exclusion of part-time faculty under Section 41117.01 (C) (13) of the Public
Employees’ Bargaining Act (2010) is antithetical to the holding in Yeshiva. Under
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Yeshiva, part-time faculty, except in rare instances, would clearly not fit the definition of
a management level employee (It would also be rare that part-time faculty would fit the
definition of supervisor.). If the true purpose of this legislation was to actually apply
Yeshiva, then both of these clauses should have been eliminated. Being “Yeshiva’d”
would result in decisions regarding the eligibility of heads of departments and divisions
as well as part-time faculty determined by analysis of the actual functional activities of
the individual employees.
As noted above, The IUC letter to Ohio State Senator Kevin Bacon characterized
the legislative intent of the original 1983 legislation to “expressively obviate the import
of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva (1980) [sic].” (Johnson, B.,
Johnson to K. Bacon, February 25, 2011). However, the Yeshiva decision only applies to
federal labor law and to private universities covered by the NLRA. Although similar in
many ways, the managerial structures of public entities are much different than that of
private institutions. Public entities tend to be more bureaucratic and are subject to more
control and influence by more constituencies. More people have control over decisionmaking in public universities, including more individuals outside of the university. For
example, in Ohio, state universities cannot raise tuition without obtaining official state
approval even if the president and board of trustees agree to do so. New majors or
programs in state universities cannot obtain government financial support without the
submission to and approval of the Ohio Board of Regents, even if the university
administration approve the major or program. Section 3333.07 (C) mandated that no state
university can offer a new degree or establish a new degree program without the approval
of the chancellor of the state system (Restrictions on state institutions, 2012). Boards of
trustees and university presidents have to answer to state executive and legislative
officials, which results in the faculty having much less authority than private university
faculty. Additionally, many non-university-specific state requirements, such as
purchasing, hiring, and administration must be utilized. Government bureaucracy and
increased accountability result in much less managerial authority and discretion to make
decisions. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980), the United States Supreme Court found
that a private university’s faculty had such extensive control over academic and personnel
decisions and such a crucial role in determining other central policies of the university
that the faculty were endowed with managerial status sufficient to remove them from
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
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Application of SB5
If SB5 had Gone Into Effect, Would Faculty Collective Bargaining Rights be
Automatically Affected?
It was assumed by the IUC that once SB5 was effective, any public university
administration would be immediately and directly prohibited from recognizing and/or
negotiating with any faculty union. However, SB5 did not directly or specifically state
that faculty are supervisors or management level employees. Consequently, university
administration could not just use SB5 to prohibit faculty from collective bargaining.
University administration must first perform an analysis and provide an explanation to
justify its classification of specific faculty as supervisors or management level
employees. In those universities where faculty are already included in a bargaining unit,
this would result in a change in a classification. If the classification or re-classification of
some (or all) faculty is opposed by the faculty member or union, this issue must be
determined by SERB. SERB’s decision may be challenged and decided in court before
finally determined (Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, 2010).
Because there is no general exclusion of all public university faculty in SB5, the
burden of proof that a faculty member is a supervisor or management level employee is
on the university administration. Further, unless a faculty member was already
determined to be a supervisor or management level employee by SERB or the courts
because of work duties and authority, any attempt to re-classify a former eligible faculty
member as a supervisor or management level employee based on the expanded definition
of SB5 must be proven by the administration.
Additionally, this analysis and determination must be done with regard to faculty at
each higher education institution. In Ohio, each higher education institution has its own
internal administration and governance policy and practice. There is no statewide contract
with state university faculty. Faculty may have different authority and/or duties at
different institutions. Not only must the faculty body at each higher education institution
be evaluated, but individual faculty members must also be evaluated to determine
whether that faculty member actually meets the criteria for classification as a supervisor
or management level employee.
The United States Supreme Court in Yeshiva recognized that whether specific
faculty are managers will depend on the circumstance of each case. The Yeshiva Court
noted that there may be some faculty at Yeshiva and other universities where some
faculty are managerial and some are not and a rational line may be drawn between faculty
members. In an attempt to define manager to include any and all faculty, the language in
SB5 does not specifically draw any line or provide any rational guidance for drawing any
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line between managerial and non-managerial faculty. Consequently, without an
agreement by the faculty union, university administration must make their argument to
SERB and the courts to decide if and where any line could be drawn. Thus, SB5 does not
give administration the right to automatically classify or re-classify faculty as supervisors
and managers or refuse to bargain with faculty without first justifying such changes as
required under the statutes.
If SB5 was Not Revoked by Referendum, Could SB5 be Successfully Challenged in
its Application to Faculty?
As noted, the definitions in SB5 of what constitutes supervisor or management level
employees with regard to faculty are extremely broad and vague. SB5 was intended to
eliminate all faculty from collective bargaining by the drafters, but they did not provide
specific language to that end. This vagueness of SB5 results in a problem with
application and interpretation by SERB and the courts when determining whether specific
faculty are supervisors or management level employees. The plain language of the statute
does not eliminate faculty from collective bargaining. For example, when defining
manager, SB5 states any faculty member who participates through any faculty senate or
“like organization” would be classified as a manager and excluded from collective
bargaining. What type of organization does that phrasing include? Would a faculty group
chatting about general education during lunch be a “like organization?” What if the group
is off campus? A more basic problem is that simply calling an organization of faculty a
faculty senate does not describe the actual managerial attributes of the organization.
Faculty senates have varying degrees of power on different issues. Often they have no
more power or authority than any individual employee. Thus, calling a faculty
organization a faculty senate means nothing. As the guidance from Yeshiva shows, it is
the real managerial power and authority that the group actually has, and not the title that
is important.
This language is especially problematic in that it must be analyzed in conjunction
with the basic definitions of supervisor and management level employee in the statute.
SB5 does not go so far as to directly eliminate faculty from collective bargaining, nor
does it make the statutory definitions of supervisor or management level employee
inapplicable to faculty. Reading it in conjunction with the definition of supervisor results
in a faculty member who participates in decisions regarding course, curriculum, or other
matters, and must have the “authority in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other public
employees; to responsibly direct them or to adjust their grievances; or to effectively
recommend such action, if the exercise of that authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment” (Public Employee’s

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1043

16

Benedict and Benedict: Ohio SB5 and Yeshiva

Bargaining Act, 2011). The additional language in SB5 does no more than could be
achieved by simply removing the existing language in the same sections that stated that
faculty could not be found to be supervisors or management level employees solely
because of this participation.
The SB5 amendment of the supervisor exclusion in Section 4117.01 (F) (3)
provided that “any faculty member or group of faculty members that participate in
decisions with respect to courses, curriculum, personnel, or other matter of academic or
institutional policy are supervisors or management level employees [emphasis added]”
(Am. Sub. S.B. 5 as passed by the Senate, 2011). None of these terms found in this
subsection are used in the basic definition of “Supervisor” in the main section (Section
4117.01 (F)) of the statute, consequently this language in SB5 is confusing and provides
no guidance for determining whether an individual or group is excluded because they are
a supervisor or because they are a management level employee. This subsection
amendment language is in the supervisor section, yet stated that if the criteria is met, it
could make an individual either a supervisor “or” a management level employee, with no
way to determine which criteria applies to which exclusionary category. Ohio has two
separate and different statutes: one defines supervisor and one defines management level
employee. These definitions are not the same statutorily.
Additionally, the language “participate in decisions with respect to” the enumerated
categories is not defined. What does “to participate in” mean? If a faculty member
suggests to the Dean that the university should offer a course, is that participating in the
decision about course or curriculum? That faculty member “participated” in the decision,
but does any participation in a decision make that person a supervisor or manager? If a
faculty member states to the Dean or department chair that a candidate is qualified in the
field, did that faculty member thereby participate in a personnel decision? Under the plain
meaning of “participate,” the faculty member has participated and is now a supervisor.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2012) defined “participate” as “to take part.”
This is a fairly low standard to meet and would make almost anyone a supervisor. If
a secretary were asked about a candidate by the administration and made a comment, this
could qualify as taking part or participating in the decision. Is the secretary now a
supervisor? We do not think so, and we doubt whether SERB or the courts would also
make this broad leap. There needs to be some rational distinction between an employee
and a supervisor. Thus, it would be up to SERB or the courts (if appealed) to decide what
amount and type of participation in a decision would result in making the faculty member
a supervisor. Because the basic definition of supervisor has existed prior to SB5 and that
basic definition was not changed, it would be likely that SERB and the courts would read
the SB5 amendment dealing with faculty “participation” in decisions in combination with
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the basic definition of supervisor to determine whether a faculty member is a supervisor
under SB5. Thus, faculty would have need to have the requisite authority to take the
enumerated actions (for example, to hire, transfer, or suspend), that action would have to
shown to be in the interest of the public employer, the exercise of that authority could not
be of a merely routine or clerical nature, and it must require the use of independent
judgment.
SB5 attempted to drastically expand who may be a supervisor in regard to faculty.
However, in the public sector, even nominal supervisors do not have the same authority
as do similar titled employees in the private sector. Much of the authority to make
personnel decisions are not given to lower level personnel who in private industry would
have much more authority. Because the lines of distinction between supervisory and
rank-and-file employees are not as clear as in the private sector, there are cases where
employees who may otherwise fit the definition of supervisor are permitted to
collectively bargain in the public sector (Malin et al., 2011).
In the private sector, supervisors are expressly excluded from coverage under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (2010). However, some public sector states allow
supervisors to bargain collectively, defining supervisors more narrowly than the NLRA.
This is because supervisors in the public sector generally have much less discretion than
private sector supervisors. Likewise titles of employees in the public sector are more
likely not to have true managerial authority and power. In many states, the exclusion of
managers from the definition of employees eligible to bargain collectively is also read
narrowly, requiring managers to have a significant high level of policy-making authority
(Malin et al., 2011). For example, SERB and the Ohio courts determined that Assistant
Fire Chiefs in Cincinnati were not management level employees under Ohio law (City of
Cincinnati v. State Employment Relations Board, 2009).
SB5’s amendment to the definition of “Management level employee” with regard to
faculty is equally vague and broad. Again, the language “participate in the governance” is
not defined anywhere in the statute. If faculty were asked about their opinions (even if
ignored) on one issue of governance by the university administration, this could be
considered participation in governance. Involvement in the enumerated activities is not
defined. Could mere meeting and providing comments in personnel decisions, such as
input into faculty selection by the department, input (but not authority) in the selection or
review of administrators fit the broad and vague definition of involvement? The type or
level of planning is also not defined. In any organization, planning usually involves all
members of the organization. Even janitorial staff may be involved in planning for the
use of janitorial supplies, as who better to estimate the usage of cleaning materials and
supplies than those using the products. Anyone using the physical resources would have
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to be involved to some extent in the planning of those resources. All employees at all
levels in an organization are usually involved in the budgeting process. This language in
SB5 applying the management level employee exclusion to faculty conflicts with the
basic definition of management level employee already in the law.
Conclusion
Using voter referendums to revoke legislation that curtails collective bargaining
rights for public sector workers is only one method available to labor to curtail the assault
on bargaining rights. In Wisconsin, this option was not available, so strategy involved
seeking a recall election of Governor Walker (Stein, 2012). Regardless of the method,
attempts to revoke legislation are both expensive and time-consuming for labor
supporters. Secter and Lauter (2012) found that more than $60 million was spent overall
in the Walker recall election in Wisconsin, with Walker and groups supporting him
having close to a 3-to-1 financial advantage. Labor groups helped to gather more than
900,000 valid signatures to force the recall election (Stein, 2012). Tavernise (2011) found
that We Are Ohio, the main group that opposed the Ohio law, poured about $30 million
into the campaign and had about 17,000 volunteers. Tremendous amounts of money and
volunteer hours need to be available to overturn legislation by voter referendum or recall
election.
The level of support needed to overturn anti-collective bargaining legislation
depends to a large extent on the scope and extent of the legislation’s limitations on labor.
Ohio’s anti-union law was much tougher than Wisconsin’s (Greenhouse, 2011). Ohio law
largely eliminated bargaining for police and firefighters, while Wisconsin’s law left those
two groups’ bargaining rights largely untouched (Greenhouse, 2011). Consequently,
Ohio’s law affected a large number of public employees and essential services in almost
all areas of the state. Ohio public university faculty were only a very small number of
those affected by SB5. Some reporters have noted that the law was highly controversial
in Ohio even among groups like firefighters and police officers that have traditionally
voted Republican (Tavernise, 2011). Additionally, options may be limited in some states.
Wisconsin had to resort to a recall election because it did not have the much narrower
option of striking down the law through a referendum (Stein, 2012). Although many
Wisconsin voters might have disliked the law and may have revoked it directly by
referendum, many of these same voters appeared to have distaste for recall elections and
would not vote to recall a sitting governor (Secter & Lauter, 2012). Thus, unlike in Ohio,
the anti-union legislation in Wisconsin was not as onerous to as many people and the
legislation could not be specifically targeted by voter referendum, but involved the recall
of an elected governor.
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Legislation that only affects a relatively small group of labor in distinct areas of the
state will face almost insurmountable odds in revoking the law by referendum or recall
efforts. It is unlikely that voters in Ohio would have shown such large support for
revoking SB5 if it only involved reclassifying public university faculty as managers or
supervisors by invoking Yeshiva-type language. Inserting Yeshiva-type language does not
appear as onerous to the general public than language the simply states that faculty
cannot bargain collectively, even though the intent is the same. Thus, the public would
not be as motivated to vote in a referendum or recall elected officials if the law stated
directly that university faculty could not bargain collectively. Additionally, revoking a
piece of legislation by voter referendum or recall election requires involvement of huge
levels of money and people. The amount of money and the number of people assembled
to revoke legislation that only affected public university faculty reclassification would be
probably be insufficient to make a change. Consequently, in an attempt to be Yeshiva’d,
faculty response should also examine the specific language of the statute and on the
proper interpretation and application of Yeshiva. This may be the only option if
referendum or recalls fail or are not feasible.
SB5, by employing language to restrict public sector collective bargaining for some
and to eliminate the right to bargain for faculty, was rightfully revoked by the Ohio
electorate just eight months after it was signed into law. In relation to the sections of the
law concerning public institutions of higher education, the proponents of SB5 did not
correctly apply Yeshiva, and they failed to connect the faculty definitions of manager and
supervisor to other sections of the public collective bargaining law.
While the Yeshiva decision did limit the number of private institutions with faculty
unions since 1980 (Rabban, 1989; Saltzman, 1998), Yeshiva makes it clear that restricting
or permitting collective bargaining on a private university’s campus is determined by that
faculty’s level of involvement in the actual governance of the institution. In fact, in
recent years, several private institutions now have faculty collective bargaining (for
example, Carroll College, University of Great Falls) and the courts used Yeshiva for
guidance in making such determinations (Benedict, 2007). The IUC of Ohio and others
incorrectly assumed that by declaring the purpose behind the language of SB5 is to reclassify faculty members as managers or supervisors automatically means the declaration
is true. However, Yeshiva asserts that faculty duties, not titles, determine which faculty
can bargain collectively and who are excluded.
Further, the inconsistency within the law would have caused long term problems,
not only for Ohio’s institutions, but also for the general population. If SB5 had survived
the recall vote, it is very likely that many of Ohio’s public universities w€ould have been

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1043

20

Benedict and Benedict: Ohio SB5 and Yeshiva

mired in long legal battles because of the lack of conformity in definitions for managers
and supervisors, costing both taxpayers and Ohio college students.

Published by The Keep, 2013

21

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2

References
Am. Sub. S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011-2012).
Am. Sub. S.B. No. 133. (1983). In Laws of Ohio (Vol. CXL, pp. 338-340). Ohio:
Secretary of State.
Amended Senate Bill No. 261. (1947). In Laws of Ohio (Vol. CXXII, pp. 449-450). Ohio:
Secretary of State.
American Association of University Professors. (2004, March-April). New collective
bargaining chapters formed. Academe Online. Retrieved from
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2004/MA/AW/ NewChap.htm on
5/17/2012.
Benedict, M.E. (2007). The effect of unionization on faculty salaries 1978-1996:
A test of empirical methods. Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public
Sector, 3, 251-274.
Berrett, D. (2011a, March 9). Tactic’s father revealed. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from
http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/ 2011/03/09/
head_of_ohio_university on 3/13/2011.
Berrett, D. (2011b, March 31). The endgame approaches. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved
from http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/03/31/ohio_
senator_slams_labor_bill_as_it_advances on 2/16/2012.
Carroll College, 345 N.L.R.B. 254 (2005).
City of Cincinnati v. State Employment Relations Board, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4861
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2009), Discretionary appeal not allowed, 124 Ohio St. 3d
1507 (2010).
Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. Dayton Board of Education, 41 Ohio St. 2d
127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
Davey, M. (2012, February 1). Indiana governor signs a law creating a ‘right to work’
state. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www. Nytimes .com
/2012/02/02/us/indiana-becomes-right-to-work-state.html on 8/7/ 2012.
Fla. Const., article I, § 6.
Greenhouse, S. (2011, March 31). Ohio’s anti-union law is tougher than Wisconsin’s.
The New York Times. Retrieved from http//www.nytimes.
com/2011/us/01ohio.html? on 7/25/2012.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1043

22

Benedict and Benedict: Ohio SB5 and Yeshiva

Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
Haw. Const., article XII, § 2.
Hershey, W. (2011, February 26). Ohio’s 64-year-old war over public unions rekindled.
Dayton Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.dayton dailynews. com/news/ohionews/ohios-64 year-old-war-over-public-unions-rekindled-1092045.html on
2/8/2012.
Hurd, R., Bloom, J., & Johnson, B. H. (1998). Directory of faculty contracts and
bargaining agents in institutions of higher education (Vol. 24, January 1998). New
York, NY: The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher
Education and the Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Inter-University Counsel of Ohio. (2011, February 22). Before the Senate Insurance,
Commerce & Labor Committee, Senator Kevin Bacon Chair, Testimony of Bruce
Johnson, President, Inter-University Council of Ohio. Copy in possession of
authors.
Jaschik, S. (2011, March 3). New tactic to kill faculty unions. Inside Higher Ed.
Retrieved from http://insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2011/
03/03/ohio_bill_would_kill_faculty_unions on 3/13/2011.
Johnson, B. (2011, February 25). Letter from Bruce Johnson, President & CEO of the
Inter-University Council of Ohio to Ohio State Senator Kevin Bacon. Copy in
possession of authors.
Kearney, R. C. (2009). Labor Relations in the public sector (4th ed.). Boca Raton, FL:
Taylor & Francis Group.
Malin, M. H., Hodges, A. C., & Slater, J. E. (2011). Public sector employment: Cases
and Materials (2nd ed.). Eagin, MN: Thomson Reuters.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2009).
National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
Nichols, J. (2010, November-December). Bowling Green faculty vote for AAUP union.
Academe Online. Retrieved from http://www.aaup.org/AAUP
/pubsres/academe/2010 /ND/nb/nb5.htm on 5/17/2012.
Ohio Conference of the American Association of University Professors (2011, March
10). The fight against Senate Bill 5. Ohio Academe, Issue VIII, pp. 3-4.

Published by The Keep, 2013

23

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2

Participate. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (11th ed.). Retrieved from
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/participate on 8/16/2012.
Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act, Ohio Revised Code §§ 4117.01-4117.24
(2010).
Rabban, D. M. (1989). Distinguishing excluded managers from covered professionals
under the NLRA. Columbia Law Review, 89, 1775-1856.
Restrictions on State Institutions, Ohio Revised Code § 3333.07 (2012).
Reuters (2011, March 10). Factbox: Several states beyond Wisconsin mull union limits.
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid
=USTRE7295QI20110311 on 7/26/2012.
Saltzman, G. M. (1988). Public sector bargaining really matters: Evidence from Ohio
and Illinois. In R. B. Freeman, and C. Ichniowski (Eds.), When public sector
workers unionize (pp. 41-80). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Saltzman, G. M. (1998). Legal regulation of collective bargaining in colleges and
universities. The NEA 1998 Almanac of Higher Education. Retrieved from
http://www.nea.org/assets/img/PubAlmanac/ALM_98_05.pdf on 8/7/2012.
S.B. No. 5, 129th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011-2012).
Schmidt, P. (2011a, March 2). Ohio senate votes to deny collective-bargaining-rights to
most public-college-professors. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from
http://0-chronicle.com.maurice.bgsu.article/ Ohio-Senate-Votes-to-Deny/126565/
on 2/16/2012.
Schmidt, P. (2011b, March 8). Anti-faculty-union proposal in Ohio came from publicuniversity association. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://0chronicle.com.maurice.bgsu.article/Anti-Faculty-Union-Proposal-in/126648/ on
2/16/2012.
Secter, B., & Lauter, D. (2012, June 5). Wisconsin Gov. Walker overcomes recall effort.
Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/news
/nationaworld/nation/la-na-wisconsin-20120606,0,0,1193583.story on 7/25/2012.
Semuels, A. (2012, June 8). Organized labor took big hits in California and Wisconsin
elections. LA Times. Retreived from latimes.com/business/la-fi-0608-union-vote20120608,0,05296793.story on 7/25/2012.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/2
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1043

24

Benedict and Benedict: Ohio SB5 and Yeshiva

Sentinel-Tribune Staff. (24 September, 2011). BGSU leaders had role in SB 5. SentinelTribune. Retrieved from www.sent-trib.com/index.php?view=
article&catid=1%3Afp&id=34194%3Abgsu-lead on 2/8/2012.
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
State Employment Relations Board (2012, March 20). All Contracts. Retrieved from
http://www.serb.state.oh.us/sections/research/WEB%20
CONTRACTS/WEB%20CONTRACT%20LIST.pdf on 5/21/2012.
Stein, J. (2012, June 6). Public sector unions are clear losers in Walker victory. Journal
Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/news/ statepolitics/unions-areclear-losers-in-walker-victory-565I09i-157377275.html on 7/25/2012.
Tavernise, S. (2012, November 8). Ohio turns back a law limiting unions’ rights. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/11/09/us/politics/ohio-turns-back-a-law-limiting-unions-rights on 7/25/2012.
The New York Times (2012, July 25). Organized labor. The New York Times, Times
Topics. Retrieved from http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference
/timetopics/subjects/organized_labor/index .html on 7/25/2012.
Troy, T (2011, February 18). Bargaining’s last overhaul in 1983: Democrats passed
reform over GOP votes. Toledo Blade. Retrieved from
www.toledoblade.com/local/Bargaining-last-overhaul-in-1983.print on 2/7/2012.
University of Great Falls, 331 N.L.R.B. 1663 (2000).

Published by The Keep, 2013

25

